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Risk and Value in Privately Financed Health Care Projects
Alberto De Marco, Ph.D.1; and Giulio Mangano2
Abstract: An empirical study is presented to investigate the risk factors affecting the value for money that can be obtained from using the
public-private partnership delivery system to develop social facility projects. Based on a model describing the main risks affecting a project, a
linear regression analysis is conducted on a data set of privately financed health care projects in the United Kingdom to explore the main
factors that might have significant relationships with the annual unitary charge payment. The results reveal that the economic and political
environment, the hospital capacity, the construction duration, and the concession period are significant factors of the price paid by the granting
authority. The study confirms that the unitary charge is not only affected by investment, operations, and financial life-cycle costs, but also by
risk factors and the level of risk allocated to the private sponsors. The proposed methodology might help both public and private parties in
improving a private finance initiative project’s compensation design, in order to achieve a higher value in privately financed infrastructures.
The given model might also support the process of better determining the amount of annual payment based on select drivers and appropriately
transferred risk factors. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000660. © 2013 American Society of Civil Engineers.
CE Database subject headings: Build/operate/transfer; Financial factors; Project management; Health care facilities; Risk management;
Regression analysis.
Author keywords: Build/operate/transfer; Financial factors; Project management; Health care facilities; Risk management; Regression
analysis.
Introduction
In recent years, the use of public-private partnerships (PPP) to build
and operate infrastructure and social facilities has been increasing
in many countries worldwide. Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT)
(2000) defines a PPP as a contractual and financing arrangement
typified by joint working between the public and private sectors.
Under this general notion, PPP includes many types of outsourcing
and joint ventures. When PPP projects were launched in the United
Kingdom under the schemes of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI),
the British government appeared to view them primarily as a way of
getting infrastructure costs off the public balance sheet, alleviating
spending on governments’ budget, seeking capital from external
financiers and keeping infrastructure investment levels up, and
avoiding the constraints imposed on the public sector (Bing
et al. 2005; Algarni et al. 2007).
PFI typically involves a consortium of private companies forming
a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to design, build, finance, and operate
a facility for a specified concession period, which usually spans from
20 to 40 years. Throughout this period, payments are reimbursed by
final users or the public sector, which remains ultimately responsible
for the delivery of the service (Connolly and Wall 2011).
There is an open debate on the advantages of PPP and the
estimation of the benefits obtained by its usage. In this regard,
a key driver in the choice of the delivery system of a constructed
facility is the evaluation of the value for money (VFM), an ex-
pression of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of service
received by a public entity. According to HMT (2007), VFM is
the optimum combination of life-cycle costs and quality of good
or service to meet the users’ requirement. The VFM driver is of
great importance for the granting authority when selecting a PPP/
PFI delivery system. VFM, in this context, can be thought of as
the best price for a given quantity and standard of output mea-
sured in terms of relative financial benefit (Grimsey and Lewis
2005). Generally, the risk transfer should be one of the major
factors considered in PPP when assessing the VFM (Clifton
and Duffield 2006).
In privately financed projects, the evaluation of the VFM is
largely affected by the level of public risk transfer to the private
sector (Andersen 2000) and it is often stated that a significant
contribution to VFM is the transfer of appropriate project risks
to private sector party (Andon 2012). A project usually consists
of dealing with several potential risks, which can be borne by either
one or both private and public parties. The value is gained by both
parties identifying and investigating specific risks prior to setting
the cost for the project (Clifton and Duffield 2006).
When the private party accepts the responsibility for a large
share of risk, the case could be reflected in the payment by the
public granting authority of a monthly or annual unitary charge
(UC), which is determined based on estimated risks and projected
capital, financing, and operating costs. The UC is the income paid
by the public authority to compensate the private sponsors for both
the capital investment made to develop the constructed facility and
the operations and maintenance expenses incurred during the
concession period for the provision of facilities management and
ancillary services (Hellowell and Pollock 2009). Therefore, the
UC can be considered as an indication of the amount of risk paid
by the public party to the SPV for taking the project risks, and as an
associated important cash flow component to determine the
expected rate of return of a PFI investment.
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The UC form of compensation of an investment applies to a
variety of PPP social facility projects. In particular, it is largely used
in PFI of hospital projects worldwide.
There is another open debate in the literature around the VFM
that can be obtained by the public sector in health care projects and
the opportunity of using PPP/PFI for the delivery of hospital proj-
ects still stands unclear (Pollock et al. 2002). In particular, there is a
high need to refine methodologies for determining the appropriate
amount of UC associated with the project risks borne by the public
authority, in order to gain an understanding of the value that can be
obtained. In this regard, De Marco et al. (2012a) have explored the
capital structure of health care projects through a risk model and
analyzed the associated value with reference to a set of build-
operate-transfer (BOT) Italian hospitals. Their model helps to
unlock the value of BOT to procure hospital projects, and it
confirms that BOT projects are likely to be expensive because
of the large non-self-financing portion of the investment required.
Their analysis shows that the amount of financial effort borne by
public parties is often high because of the risks that are shouldered
by private party. Therefore, it is very important to identify the risk
factors that impact on the level of UC paid by public authorities, in
order to identify a proper level of UC associated to an effective risk
sharing policy.
However, the exploration on the relationship between the level
of risks and the UC amount in BOT/PFI hospital projects is still
unexplored and questions arise among scholars and practitioners
regarding how to balance the appropriate level of UC in relation
to the risks borne by the parties involved.
With the purpose of overcoming that research gap and address-
ing the question, this paper aims to understand the risks in health
care PPP/PFI projects that could influence the determination of the
UC for the delivery of contracted services in order to improve the
VFM that can be obtained. Based on the assumption that the capital
structure, and, consequently the UC amount, is inherently associ-
ated with the project risk profile and allocation between the contract
parties (Amatucci and Facci 2006), the analysis explores the main
risk factors that might have significant relationships with the UC of
a PFI hospital project. The exploration is addressed to public
authorities and private sponsors to help refine the process of
determining the appropriate level of UC associated with the risk
factors allocated to the parties.
In the next sections, we first review pertinent literature and gain
an understanding of the risks involved in a PPP project. Second, we
develop a risk model to anticipate the relationship between the
identified risks and the capital structure of a PPP project. Then,
we present a linear regression analysis of a data set of British
PFI hospitals in order to understand how risks affect the UC.
Finally, we discuss the results as a contribution towards a new
methodology for determining the appropriate amount of the UC
in health care PPP projects and draw conclusions on potential
applicability together with future research directions.
Background
PPP has been being largely used in many western countries, and
especially in the United Kingdom, which is first ranked among
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries using PPP and where PPP/PFI is one of
the key systems to develop public sector services and facilities
(Broadbent et al. 2003). The PPP model was cultivated in response
to concerns about the increased level of public debt following the
macroeconomic dislocation of the 1970s and 1980s when pressure
mounted to change the standard model of public procurement
(Connolly andWall 2011). Services and facilities are often essential
for the public and involve a huge amount of capital investment. If
all these initiatives are financed solely by the government, it would
be a tremendous pressure on the government’s financial status
(Cheung et al. 2009). During the period from 1990 to 2009, the
United Kingdom has accounted for some two-thirds of all
European PPP projects. The annual PPP program had increased
from nine constructed facility projects valued at £667 million in
1995 to 65 projects with a total value of £7.6 billion in 2002
(HMT 2003), while from 2005 to 2010 more than 200 projects
had been closed, valuing up to £26 billion. Since its introduction,
PPP has been the UK government’s preferred method for public
infrastructure procurement (Handley-Schachler and Gao 2003).
As a result, PPP now accounts from 10 to 14% of Britain’s total
annual investment in public facilities.
The success of PPP/PFI is based on claims that it provides for
improved service due to private sector’s efficiency, reduced burden
on public budgets to develop new social facilities, and risk
reduction (Lattemann et al. 2009). Askar and Gab-Allah (2002)
identify several advantages in using PPP, in particular, the
establishment of a private benchmark to measure the efficiency
of similar public sector projects.
However, a PPP form of contract should be used only when
more VFM is delivered than in the traditional public-sector-funded
route (Carrillo et al. 2006). The VFM analysis should be concerned
with estimation of total risk and associated sharing between the
contract parties (Heald 2003). The assessment of VFM becomes
central, especially when the operator model is used to buy now
and pay later non-self-financing facilities. In these cases, an initial
public capital investment is replaced with a UC paid during the
whole life cycle that reimburses the private contractor’s investments
in public infrastructure (Robinson and Scott 2009).
In PPP/PFI, one of the most important drivers of VFM is the risk
transfer, which means that appropriate risks are transferred to the
relevant private sector stakeholders capable of managing them
better and who are thereby capable of providing higher quality,
more efficient services (Jin 2010). Complex arrangements and
incomplete contracting in PPP projects have led to increased risk
exposure for both public and private partners. Effective risk allo-
cation is therefore challenging and demanding (Jin and Zhang
2011). Khadaroo (2008) highlights the importance of risk transfer
and illustrates the use of parameters to quantify qualitative factors,
even if the assessment of VFM may be hindered by lack of trans-
parency. Typically, the private sector handles the service delivery
risks better than the public sector. This is not surprising given their
different business drivers. On the one hand, the key driver for the
private sector is the profit imperative, which consists of controlling
costs and managing appropriately risks. On the other hand, the key
driver for the public sector is risk mitigation, which usually leads to
more expensive cost. The risk transfer increases VFM only if the
price charged by the private sector for managing the risk is less than
the cost paid by the government (Hayford 2006). For Nisar (2007)
the risk transfer in PPPs is a key VFM driver that is likely to en-
hance the possibility of PPP solution becoming a viable alternative
to traditional methods of service provision.
In particular, when an annual payment is necessary to compen-
sate the financial viability of the project, the UC is determined not
only based on the costs of investment, debt charges, operations, and
maintenance, but also on the project’s costs arising from the
transfer of risks onto the private party (Daube et al. 2008; Pitt et al.
2006). The UC is composed of a service fee for the operations of
the facility, maintenance charges, and risk premiums. In this notion,
the UC also serves as coverage of the project risk borne by the
private sponsors. However, despite common acceptance of this
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principle, little past research is available to investigate the extent to
which the UC is associated with risks in PFIs. In other terms, there
is the need to understand how the UC is affected not just by
financial ratios, but also by estimated risk and the risk allocation
policy (Zhang 2005).
In order to contribute to an understanding of how much the
private sector can reasonably charge for taking the risk, and to
uncover the VFM that can be obtained when using a PFI scheme,
an empirical model is developed based on the identification of the
most important risk factors that might affect the UC amount. This
is intended to help both the private and public parties in improving
PFI project’s compensation design and VFMmodels that can be used
to develop social facilities with a PPP delivery system and, in par-
ticular, to assist in determining the annual UC paid to the SPV for
compensation of social facility operations, maintenance and services.
Methodology
The research is conducted through the following steps. First, we
develop a model to identify the risk factors that might have an
influence on the UC in PPP/PFI projects. To this end, we associate
indicators and corresponding measurable parameters to each
identified source of risk.
Second, we collect data through consultation of some HM
treasury’s databases providing updated comprehensive information
on PPP projects developed in the UK (HMT 2011). Based on data
collected, a data set of 49 projects is created reporting the annual
UC payments over their life cycle from 1992 to 2060. The complete
data set is available upon request to the authors. The entire
investment totals £2,575.5 million and the average project’s size
is £52.56 million.
Then, we conduct an exploratory data analysis and investigate
the multicollinearity among the risk parameters.
Finally, after assuming that the UC is the response variable and
the risk parameters are independent variables, we complete a linear
regression analysis to capture the relationship with the project risk
profile. In particular, the linear regression analysis, using Minitab
software tool, tests if the independent variables considered are rel-
evant factors and whether it has positive or negative impact on the
UC paid by the public agency. Linear regression proves to be a
valuable and widely used tool for investigating managerial factors
and for reflecting relationships among variables within data sets.
This predominant methodology can be applied in order to quantify
the strength of relationship between a dependent variable and
independent variables (Tukey 1977).
Risk Model
The concept of PPP/PFI is founded on the cardinal principle that
risk should be taken by the party who can best manage it. In order
to formulate an appropriate risk response plan, not only risks must
be identified, but also their impacts must be assessed (Iyer and
Sagheer 2010).
In a PFI project, the structuring of the financial scheme is a
complex process where several agreements are formed to ensure
the basic financial flows and the profitability of the investment
for every part involved (Xenidis and Angelis 2005). In this process,
the issue of risks and risk allocation is a key point in the successful
application of a PFI project. Extensive research is available in the
area of risk identification in PPP and the importance of risk in
structuring the financing/capital structure. For instance, Xenidis
and Angelis (2005) focus on the analysis of the financial risks;
Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut (2003) take into account political,
financial, construction, operational, and market risks; Thomas et al.
(2003) classify risks into four projects phases namely: develop-
ment, construction, operation, and project life cycle; and the
Accounting Standard Board (ASB) (1998) outlines six major risks
that have to be considered when drawing up a contract: interest rate,
unavailable credit, decline in stock market price, exchange rate
depreciation, and slump in domestic demand.
However, very few studies investigate the role of the UC in a
PPP/PFI and how risk factors affect in its amount paid by the public
party for the delivery of the contracted services. Moreover, little
specific research is available in PPP/PFI health care projects and
it is mostly related to proving the advantages of hospital facilities
development with PPP (Jefferies and McGeorge 2009). With this
regard, Holmes et al. (2006) state that the health care sector im-
proves the quality of services by implementing privately financed
initiatives. Also, Akintoye and Chinyio (2005) show that the usage
of PPP in the health care field is increasing in the UK market in
terms of number, capital value, and size of projects, and the main
aim is to achieve a better risk management.
Sources of Risk
To fill in this research gap, an analysis of the sources of external
risks that are inherent with the UC of PPP/PFI hospital projects in
the UK is proposed. Based on models available in the literature to
classify risks (Zhang 2005; Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut 2003;
Xenidis and Angelides 2005; Accounting Standard Board 1998),
we identify various sources of risk with associated representative
indicators. One or more parameters are identified to measure each
indicator, as summarized in Table 1.
Indicators and Parameters of Financial Risk
Financial risks are important because they may cause negative im-
pact on the project’s expected cash flow and endanger the project
bankability or limit profitability (Xenidis and Angelides 2005). In
this context, the bankability can be determined via the debt service
cover ratio (DSCR), which is referred to as the amount of cash flow
available to reimburse debt. It is defined as per Eq. (1)
DSCR ¼ Net Income
Total
!
payment on outstanding debt ð1Þ
It is computed as the net cash flow generated over summation of
principal and interest for each payment period. It is an indication of
the ability of a project to service its debt (Ludeke-Freund and Loock
2011). A DSCR less than 1 indicates the inability of the project’s
Table 1. Risk Sources with Associated Indicators and Measurable
Parameters
Risk sources Indicators Parameters
Financial Cost of capital IRS
Inflation INFL
Political/
Economic
Tax level TR
Investment environment RQ
GE
ER
Availability of capital PC
Construction Project size HC
Project duration TI
Market Revenue generation CP
Note: IRS = interest rate swap; INFL = inflation rate; TR = tax rate; RQ =
regulatory quality; GE = government effectiveness; ER = employment rate;
PC = private credit; HC = hospital capacity; TI = time interval; CP =
concession period.
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gross profits to serve its debts, whereas greater than one suggests not
only that the SPV is able to serve the debt obligations with the cash
flow generated by the project, but also to making profit. The DSCR
should meet a target DSCR on each payment period to satisfy the
bank’s financial covenants (De Marco et al. 2012b).
Financial risks that might affect the respect of a target
DSCR are the cost of capital and inflation (Schaufelberger and
Widapapisut 2003).
The cost of capital is a key factor in determining the intensity of
a debt and internal rate of return, which consequently affects the
feasibility, construction and operations of a project (Ling and
Lim 2007). The cost of capital risk is measured in our data set
via the interest rate swap (IRS). The IRS is an agreement between
two parties to exchange a series of interest payments without
exchanging the underlying debt. One party pays a fixed rate, while
the other party pays the floating amount of interest. This kind of
financial instrument provides a hedge against interest rate risk
(Bicksler and Chen 1986). It is assumed that a higher interest rate
would tend to increase the cost of capital and, consequently, reduce
the DSCR so that the UC is also expected to increase. In the data
set, the IRS is picked on the date of the project’s financial closure
with value associated to the length of the concession period
(Econonmagic 2011): for example, a 25-year IRS is selected for
a project having a 25-year-long concession period. For any project
with concession period longer than 30 years, a 30-year IRS has
been recorded.
Inflation also plays an important role because it negatively
affects the purchasing power and, therefore, the return on invest-
ment. When inflation goes up, the project costs increase, therefore
the DSCR goes down and consequently the UC has to increase.
Inflation here is measured via the Inflation rate (INFL), with
historical monthly values as reported by Rate Inflation (2011).
Indicators and Parameters of Political and Economic
Risk
Posautz (2012) underlines the importance of taxes in a PPP project,
since taxes have an influence on costs and profit. The tax regime is
measured by the tax rate (TR) parameter, referred to as the percent
fiscal charge on profit. If the TR increases, the net cash flow
reduces and so does the DSCR. As a consequence, to compensate
for such decrease and keep the DSCR up to the target level, the UC
needs to be increased. In the data set, TR is provided by the Institute
for Fiscal Studies of HMT (2011).
The investment environment is an expression of the political and
economic stability, measured here by four parameters, namely:
private credit, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, and
employment rate. The political and normative context is very im-
portant and it has an influence on the capability of a country to draw
investments. The normative and permit environment is reflected on
access to politics, level of competition, fiscal terms, and domination
of narrow interest that could hinder the efficiency and the
performance of a project (Arditi et al. 2010).
The private credit (PC) parameter, provided by World Bank
(2011), gives a measure of the financial resources made available
to the private sector. The values recorded are expressed as annual
percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP). In order to obtain
the real amount of financing provided to the private sector, the
indicator is multiplied by the annual GDP. As far as the availability
of private credit increases, a SPV will have higher chances to get
higher debt and the mechanism will drive interest rate down. In
turn, the UC will also decrease.
The regulatory quality (RQ) measures the ability of the
government to formulate and implement policies and regulations
that permit and promote private sector development (World Bank
2011) and, in turn, it captures the predisposition towards outsourc-
ing of public services to the private sector. This parameter is
calibrated to be included within a range from −2.5 to þ2.5, with
2.5 being the most favorable.
The government effectiveness (GE) measures the perception of
the quality of public services, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation (World Bank 2011). GE ranges from −2.5, indicat-
ing scarce quality, up to þ2.5, indicating high quality.
The definition of these three parameters suggests a positive
correlation with the UC. As a matter of fact, if governments and local
authorities are inclined to outsource services to the private sector and
have a high level of credibility, the UC is likely to increase, due to the
higher risk that is assumed by the private party. Moreover, a high
level of RQ, PC, and GE indicate a favorable environment, wherein
the contract power of private parties is higher and, accordingly, the
proposed UC would be also higher. On the contrary, a vibrant and
favorable environment is likely to increase the level of competition
among companies, with a negative effect on the level of the UC.
Therefore, it is difficult to anticipate which one of these two elements
of political and economic risk prevails on the UC.
The employment rate (ER) represents the percent of the
population of those from 16 to 64 years old that are employed
in each specific county of the UK. According to a survey carried
out by Bloomberg (2009), unemployment is a factor that depresses
consumers’ spending. This confirms the idea that if the employ-
ment rate is high, consumers tend to spend more money and it will
be easier for companies to get profits from their investments. A
high employment rate represents a good, stable, and nonrisky
economy. Thus the higher the ER, the lower the UC, thanks to
a lower level of risk borne by the private sponsors.
Indicators and Parameters of Construction Risk
Large projects can gain from organizational and physical econo-
mies of scale. As a matter of fact, Scherrer and McQuaid
(2010) note that in the European context PPP projects sizing be-
tween €10 to €15 million make sense. In the health care sector,
some further aspects should be taken into account. First, large-sized
hospitals take advantage of greater economies of scale; however,
small-sized hospitals require a lower investment if a flexible and
potentially expandable facility is designed. Here the project size
is measured via the hospital capacity (HC) that is the number of
beds available in the hospital. A negative correlation is expected
with the UC: the overhead cost will in fact be allocated over a
greater number of buildings/services. Given this reduced costs,
the same DSCR can be obtained by reducing the UC value.
Risk is also driven by the project complexity, resulting from
construction site conditions, sophisticated design, tight schedule
pressure, innovative building technologies, and construction
logistics. Project complexity typically results in delayed comple-
tion, increased amount of loan interest and deferred revenues. It
is assumed here that long construction duration is an inherent sig-
nificant characteristic of a complex project (Hoffman et al. 2007).
The parameter associated to the project complexity indicator is the
time interval (TI), which is calculated as the difference of number
of months between the date of the financial closure and the start
date of the first UC payment. The longer the TI, the riskier the
project and the greater the UC amount.
Indicators and Parameters of Market Risk
The market risk is related to the project revenue and reflects the
capability of a project to generate cash flow in order to make profit
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or, at least, reimburse the debt incurred. In our model, we measure
the capability to generate revenue with the concession period (CP),
as proposed by De Marco et al. (2012a) who prove that the con-
cession period is a good parameter of market risk and that the CP
appears to be a significant factor of the percentage of public finding
into the total investment in PFI health care initiatives. The CP is the
length of the contract expressed in years during which the SPV
operates and maintains the service on the behalf of the public party
before handing it back.
Projects with a short CP could result in a high tariff regime so that
the risk burden due to short concession period may be transferred to
the final users (Khanzadi et al. 2012). Typically, a longer CP provides
better opportunities for generating income; however, granting an ex-
cessively lengthy concession may result in government loss, and the
impact of risk uncertainties on the estimation of various economic
variables can be heavier (Shen et al. 2002). Therefore, the length
of the CP, from occupancy to transfer, is usually determined to assure
attractiveness and protect the interest of both the public owner and
concessionaire (Shen and Wu 2005).
Focusing on the health care environment, technology has
rapidly progressed in the last decades and the trend is anticipated
by PPP projects. This implies that hospital activities can change
even drastically over the life cycle of a PPP initiative (Hensher
and Edwards 1999). Consequently, especially for technologically
uncertain medical services, a longer concession period, which im-
plies more difficult forecast, is expected to have a reduced UC,
since the amount of money that a public authority would be willing
to pay decreases as far as its own risk increases.
Data Analysis
Based on the proposed risk model and data set of PFI British
hospital projects, Table 2 summarizes the independent parameters
that are supposed to have an influence on the amount of UC, taken
as the response variable. The columns report the lower quartile, the
median, the upper quartile and standard deviation, respectively. In
the model, the ratio of the unitary charge to the total investment,
which represents the expected return for the SPV, is the response
variable (UC/INV). It ranges from 0.078 to 0.2342 with the median
value approximately 0.1567.
The regression analysis aims to test if the independent variables
taken into account are significant factors and whether they have a
negative or positive impact on the response variable (Tukey 1977).
A negative influence signifies that an increase (decrease) in the
independent variable determines a decrease (increase) in the
independent variable. On the contrary, a positive influence indi-
cates that the same sign is between the independent and response
variable variations.
The predictive variables have to be linearly independent: it can
happen in multiple regression that the independent variables are
correlated and the risk is of amplifying the variance measurement
of the regression coefficients (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). Perfect
multicollinearity is a very rare event, but some collinearity is very
common. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is used to measure
such level of collinearity of a variable versus the others. It is termed
as 1=ð1 − R2Þ, where R2 is the coefficient of determination of one
predictor on all the other predictors; it represents the proportion of
the variance in the independent variable that is associated with the
other independent variables in the model. If VIF equals 1, there is
no multicollinearity; if it ranges from 1 to 4, predictors may be
moderately correlated and if VIF is greater than 4, the regression
coefficients are poorly estimated (O’Brien 2007).
Results (Table 3) prove that multicollinearity exists in the model
because INFL, PC, and GE have a very high VIF. Therefore, multi-
collinearity is avoided by removing these predictors from the model
(Table 4).
A first statistical analysis on the dependent variable shows a
nonnormality of records (Fig. 1). Therefore, a logarithmic
transformation has been applied on UC/INV data, which leads
to a normal distribution (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2 shows that the values are all included within the normal
distribution curve line. Since the parameters of the data set have
different order of magnitude and thus results cannot be compared,
the interpretation of results could be awkward. In order to
overcome this issue, a regression is carried out on standardized
variables (Carroll and Carroll 2002). To this end, for each variable
the mean and the standard deviation are calculated, and each ob-
servation is normalized using Eq. (2)
z ¼ x − μ
σ
ð2Þ
where x = value to be standardized; μ =mean of the population; and
σ = standard deviation of the population.
The results of the regression analysis are provided in Table 5,
where the columns report the estimate of the regression coefficient,
the standard error of the estimate, the value of t statistic and the
p-value.
The level of significance is associated to the p-value, which
ranges from 0 to 1, is obtained from the observed sample and rep-
resents the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis.
The smaller the p-value, the lower the probability that rejecting the
null hypothesis is wrong. If it is less than a predetermined critical
value, usually equal to 5%, the null hypothesis is rejected. In the
regression analysis the null hypothesis states that the coefficient
equals zero (Montgomery and Runger 1999).
Results reveal that RQ, ER, HC, TI, and HC are significant fac-
tors of the UC amount. Regulatory quality highlights the perception
Table 2. Summary of Exploratory Analysis
Variable Acronym Lower quartile Median Upper Standard deviation
UC/investment (response variable) UC/INV 0.1266 0.149 0.184 0.0372
Interest rate swap (%) IRS 4.72 4.90 5.54 0.00599
Inflation rate (%) INFL 1.357 1.547 2.12 0.5321
Tax rate (%) TR 30 30 30 0.00781
Private credit (million £) PC 118.5 150.8 188.1 33.82
Regulatory quality RQ 1.71 1.8 1.81 0.1013
Government effectiveness GE 1.62 1.86 1.93 0.16
Employment rate (%) ER 68.9 71 73.9 0.037
Hospital capacity (number of beds) HC 90 286 516.5 375.4
Time interval (number of months) TI 0 29 68 44.53
Concession period (years) CP 30 30 30 2.621
922 / JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT © ASCE / AUGUST 2013
J. Constr. Eng. Manage. 2013.139:918-926.
of how the government favors outsourced services to the private
sector and, therefore, it shows a negative relationship as expected:
when public authorities create a favorable environment towards
private companies, the level of risk taken by the private party
reduces and, as a consequence, the UC amount charged in return
for borne risk may be lower. In the same way, ER has a negative
influence on the unitary charge over investment ratio. High levels
of ER indicates that for favorable general economic conditions,
there are less risks for investors and, in turn, lower levels of
UC. A positive correlation emerges with the dimension of the
project, in terms of number of beds available in the hospital: this
means that economies of scale are inconsistent, but on the contrary
large hospitals are considered riskier because of reduced flexibility
and higher probability of not being capable of exploiting the whole
care capacity.
The complexity of the project, measured by difference of
number of months between the date of financial close and the start
of the first unitary charge payment, is also a significant factor. As
expected in the anticipated risk model, the longer this period
the higher the complexity of the project and the higher the UC
requested in light of greater risk borne by the SPV.
Also, the concession period shows a negative influence on the
UC: shorter CPs can give fewer opportunities to make profit,
and therefore the UC needs to be greater in order to make the
investment more attractive.
Finally, some tests on residuals are analyzed to validate the
consistency of the model. In particular the residuals versus order
(Fig. 3) does not indicate periodicity, trends or time series; the re-
siduals versus fits (Fig. 4) does not show evidence of systematic
Table 3. Multicollinearity Analysis of the Complete Model
IRS INFL TR PC RQ GE ER HC TI CP
VIF 4.5 7.2 4.4 28.8 5.1 30.15 1.2 1.6 2.2 1.9
Table 4. Multicollinearity Analysis of the Complete Model
IRS TR RQ ER HC TI CP
VIF 2.3 2.3 2.4 1.1 1.6 1.7 1.7
Fig. 1. Plot of unitary charge over investment ratio
Fig. 2. Plot of -ln(unitary charge over investment ratio)
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error in the residuals of the regression (we can assume that the least
sum squared of residuals equals zero); and the normal probability
plot (Fig. 5) shows that it is possible to assume normally distributed
residuals.
Discussion of Results
The results of the regression analysis originate some considerations
on the motivations for undertaking PPP/PFI hospital initiatives and,
in particular, on the relationships between the risk profile and the
UC paid by public authorities.
Some of the relevant drivers confirm expected inherent relation-
ships. First, a favorable economic and political environment tends
to reduce the amount of UC because of a more competitive market
forcing companies to bid lower UC payments, and less risk is borne
by private sponsors, with a subsequent lower UC.
Second, the positive relationship with the construction complex-
ity, by some means indicated by the numbers of months between
the day of the financial close and the first payment, and the number
of beds available in the hospitals, suggests that the public expendi-
ture is lower in small hospitals that are inherently characterized by a
shorter construction period. These kinds of projects rely on two
aspects: on the one hand, facilities with small capacity are likely
to have better utilization rate than large-sized hospitals; on the other
hand, small facilities have shorter construction periods and likely
reduced construction risk.
Finally, the concession period appears to have a negative effect
on the UC: a longer concession period is likely to reduce the
amount of UC, which is paid for a longer period of time.
The model addresses some practical implications consistent
with the interpretation of the empirical results.
All types of risk sources that have been identified in the model
are designated to have an influence on the unitary charge over total
investment ratio. De Marco et al. (2012a) underline how public
financing allows reducing the burden of project risks on the should-
ers of the private party in the health care sector in Italy. Similarly, in
the UK market, the UC paid by public owners to private companies
represents a way to share risks and reduce the risk exposure of
private shareholders.
The data set also provides an opportunity for better understand-
ing other aspects of the UC and VFM in health care PFI projects.
For example, it allows for analyzing the potential influence of the
experience that both granting authorities and private sponsors
acquire in the process of negotiating the UC and obtaining their
expected VFM. Although experience is not considered directly into
the regression model because it is not a risk factor, the possible
impact of experience on the amount of UC is analyzed via compar-
ing the time interval (TI) variable with the UC trend. TI is a good
proxy of the experience of the parties: it is defined as the number of
months from financial close to the point in time of observation
(December 31, 2011) and it addresses the idea that old projects
have lower contractual and legislative experience than recent
financially closed projects.
The corresponding scatter plot is given in Fig. 6 showing a
negative effect: the older the project, the lower the UC charged
to the public authority.
An explanation is inherent with the notion that probably in
recent years the contractual power of private parties entering
PPP contracts has grown, resulting in an increased level of pro-
posed UCs. This presumably can be interpreted as a rising contract
power gained by increasingly experienced private sponsors in
negotiating UC contracts in the British health care sector.
Implications, Limitations, and Future Research
Even though this work does not provide a model for immediate and
direct applicability by contracting professionals, it urges the need
for considering some currently neglected but important risk factors
when determining the UC, and it is a source of potential implica-
tions for both granting authorities and PFI bidders. On the one
Table 5. Results of Regression Analysis
Variable Acronym Estimate Standard error t-value p-value
Interest swap rate IRS −0.0600 0.07910 −0.76 0.4520
Tax rate TR 0.0673 0.07280 0.89 0.3770
Regulatory quality RQ −0.4888 0.08010 −6.10 0.0001
Employment rate ER −0.1911 0.05279 −3.62 0.0010
Hospital capacity HC 0.1354 0.06399 2.12 0.0400
Time interval TI 0.7024 0.06690 10.50 0.0001
Concession period CP −0.1952 0.06689 −2.92 0.0060
R-squared 86.9%
R-squared (adjusted) 84.7%
Constant −0.0548
Fig. 3. Residuals versus order
Fig. 4. Residuals versus fits
Fig. 5. Normal probability plot of residuals
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hand, it might serve the purpose of helping public authorities to
achieve a higher level of VFM in PFI projects and provideg some
guidelines on the main risks factors that can influence the UC.
Also, the proposed methodology might support the decision-
making process for determining an appropriate amount of UC,
by considering the effects that the risk factors statistically have
on the annual payment.
On the other hand, project sponsors can use this model to let the
granting authorities understand the impact of risk transfer on the
UC and achieve a better risk sharing in return for a lower level
payment charged to their granting authority.
Future research is primarily directed toward such directions
and aimed at encapsulating the results of this analysis into method-
ologies for ex ante VFM estimation and into the process of
determining the amount of UC in financial plans of PFI projects.
Also, future research is addressed to apply the risk model to
other types of social facilities to validate its extended applicability.
Another current limitation of the model is that the quality of
supplied services has not been taken into account, even if it is a
crucial aspect in the evaluation of the VFM and, in turn, in the
determination of the UC. The proposed methodology aims at sup-
porting existing models for the evaluation of the VFM, meaning
that it addresses the decision maker to consider the risk factors
in the determination of a more proper UC. In line with this
argument, future research is also directed to the evaluation of
the quality of the service that are provided, together with financial
elements and significant risk factors, in order to give to both the
public and private party a direct methodology capable to effectively
size the amount of the UC.
Conclusion
Claiming that the UC is influenced by the project’s inherent risk
borne by the private sponsors, a model is developed with the
purpose of understanding the risk factors that might influence
the UC of a PPP/PFI hospital project. In particular, financial, politi-
cal/economic, construction, and market risks are defined, along
with their associated indicators and parameters. Based on this
model, various data pertinent to the mentioned risk drivers are
collected from a number of PFI hospital projects in the UK.
The analysis shows that regulatory quality, employment rate,
hospital capacity, construction duration, and concession period
have a significant relationship with the unitary charge over the total
investment dependent variable.
This methodology might help the purpose of better understand-
ing the main factors affecting the UC periodically corresponded by
public authorities to private SPVs for operating a social facility.
Since the UC is an important component of the project’s VFM, this
model assists in understanding the ideal characteristics of service-
performing hospital PPPs. As a matter of fact, in assessing and
delivering VFM, it is important to consider the optimum allocation
of risks between the parties, and in particular the amount of risk
charged to the private sponsors (HMT 2006). The proposed meth-
odology could support both public authorities and private conces-
sionaires in the risk allocation decision and in the associated
determination of the UC.
Our empirical analysis shows that it is possible to achieve a
higher level of VFM in PPP/PFI hospital projects when developed
within a good economic and political environment in order to
stimulate the competition and, in turn, to decrease the public
expenditure. Moreover, small-sized hospitals requiring a short
construction effort and granted for long concession periods are
more likely to be better exploited, bear a lower level of construction
risk, and, in turn, have a lower UC amount.
The goal of this analysis is to highlight that risk factors should
be taken into account into future design models of PPP. Therefore,
future research is addressed to develop models that, based on
evaluation of significant sources of risk, could provide direct appli-
cability for both private and public contracting professionals and
allow predetermining the amount of UC in order to both deliver
and obtain the desired value.
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